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NOTES
as of the year of the first exploration expenditures,"' but the 1964
Revenue Act provisions permit the taxpayer to wait until the first
year in which a development or operational expenditure is made."0
Generally, the first type of expenditure to necessitate an election
under the new rules will be intangible drilling and development costs.
Therefore, the new rules provide the taxpayer with more time to
make an election than was provided under the 1939 Code rules.
The apparent intent of Congress is to eliminate the effect of the
broad treatment of the 1954 Code by returning to the lease concept
of aggregation of mineral interests as the general rule for determining
the property unit for depletion purposes. The rules established by
the Revenue Act of 1964 appear to have accomplished this purpose.
The new rules also appear to establish a more consistent approach to
oil and gas taxation in that they have eliminated a major source of
administrative friction. 1 In addition, the new provisions should result
in a more practical business approach to the problem of depletion,
although the industry seemed to have adjusted to the operating unit
concept without too much difficulty.
Even though the rules appear to have reduced certain tax-saving
opportunities stemming from aggregations, they do permit a rather
substantial amount of tax planning through a careful combination
and separation of property interests within each tract; and it appears
that a careful analysis of the particular problems involved will con-
tinue to pay dividends in the depletion area.
John W. Bickle
Securities Regulation-investment Adviser Compelled To
Disclose Potential Conflict of Interests
I. THE COMMON LAW REMfEDY
The classical common law formula for fraud and deceit required:
(1) a false representation of a material fact, (2) the defendant must
know of the falsity (scienter) and make the statement for the pur-
59G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 245, modified by G.C.M. 24094, 1944-1 Cum.
Bull. 250.
0 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(b) (4), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
61 Although the operating unit concept of aggregations was in many situations ad-
vantageous, it was administratively cumbersome to deal with and had become a prime area
for negotiation and compromise from a practical standpoint between the taxpayer and the
Internal Revenue Service. This problem is discussed in Staff of Joint Economic Comm.,
88th Cong., 2d Sess., The Federal Tax System: Facts and Problems 1964, 107-18 (1964).
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pose of inducing the plaintiff to rely on it, (3) the plaintiff must
justifiably rely on it and (4) suffer damages as a consequence. The
relief commonly sought at law between parties to an arm's length
transaction will normally be awarded only if all of the above elements
are found to be present.' The content of common law fraud and
deceit, however, has not remained static, but has varied with the
nature of the relief sought, the relationship of the parties and the
merchandise in issue.s
II. MODIFICATION OF COMMON LAW REMEDY BY
SECURITIES LEGISLATION
The common law concept of fraud and deceit, technically con-
strued, proved to be ill adapted to the regulation of securities and to
the protection of the investing public.' This inadequacy, combined
with the abuses which contributed to the market crash of 1929 and
the depression of the 1930's, resulted in the passage of the six
securities-regulation acts.' The first was the Securities Act of 1933.'
Congress was prompted to initiate this legislation by a Presidential
message requesting that the ancient rule of "caveat emptor" be super-
seded by a policy of full disclosure in the securities field.' The gen-
eral antifraud provision of this act' makes unlawful any form of
1 "Without the concurrence of all of these elements there can be no actionable fraud.
None can be presumed, but each must be strictly proved, and the burden is on the
plaintiff to establish the fraud by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence." Equitable
Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 112 F.2d 302, 308 (7th Cir. 1940), rev'd on other
grounds, 312 U.S. 410 (1941).
'See generally Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 Yale L.J. 227 (1933).
'Ibid.
* (1) Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 55 80b-1-21
(1958).
(2) Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 55 80a-1-52
(1958).
(3) Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb
(1958).
(4) Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
55 79-79z-6 (1958).
(5) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj
(1958).
(6) Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §5 77a-77aa (1958).
548 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1958).
'H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
748 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of
a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
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fraud, untruth or omission of a material fact, with respect to the
sale of any securities in interstate commerce or by use of the mails.
The act provides civil' as well as governmental sanctions for fraud.
The second act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' extended the
scope of disclosure required in dealing with securities listed on national
securities exchanges. Rather than regulating offers of securities by
the issuing company, this act regulates transactions in outstanding
securities. This act created the Securities Exchange Commission and
gave it responsibility for providing rules and regulations to imple-
ment the general regulatory pattern of the act. Among the regula-
tions adopted by the Commission are the definition of acts or prac-
tices which constitute a "manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance"" prohibited by the antifraud provisions of the statute."
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the last act in the field of
securities regulation, also contained antifraud provisions." This act
sThe 1934 act contains three specific civil liability sections: §§ 9(e), 16(b), and 18.
Cases which have asserted civil liability under this act include: Fischman v. Raytheon
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1941);
Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Stella v. Kaiser,
82 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Acker v. Schulte, 74 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1947);
Bach v. Quigan, 5 F.R.D. 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1945). For numerous cases involving the recapture
from insiders of short-term trading profits under § 16(b), see 2 Loss, Securities Regulation
1040 (2d ed. 1961).
948 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1958).
" This regulation is identical to 78i(a) (2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
48 Stat. 889, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 78i (a) (2) (1958).
1148 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1958), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
12 54 Stat. 852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (Supp. V, 1964), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or
prospective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security
to or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person
other than such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any
security for the account of such client, without disclosing to such client in
writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in which he
is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction. The
prohibitions of this paragraph shall not apply to any transaction with a cus-
tomer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is not acting as an
investment adviser in relation to such transaction;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fradu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of
this paragraph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means
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makes it unlawful for registered investment advisers" to engage
in practices which constitute fraud or deceit, requires that they dis-
close any interest in transactions executed for their clients, prohibits
profit-sharing arrangements and effectively prevents the assignment
of investment advisory contracts without the client's consent.
These acts were designed to promote a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry by requiring, among other things,
full disclosure of anything material to the interests of the investing
public. In the spirit of this legislation, the courts have recognized
that the "essential objective of securities legislation is to protect those
who do not know market conditions from the overreaching of those
who do."" Recognizing the presence of a gross inequality of knowl-
edge between the professional securities firm or adviser and the
average investor, the courts have held that the fraud provisions in
the Securities Act of 193315 and the Securities Exchange Act of
19341 are not limited to circumstances which give rise to a common
law action for deceit." In SEC v. Torr, s nondisclosure by a broker-
dealer was held to be a violation of the antifraud provisions of both
the 1933 and 1934 securities acts." The defendants recommended the
purchase of stocks without disclosing to their clients that they were
to receive bonuses for any sales of this stock attributable to their
influence." There was nothing to indicate that the defendants mis-
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as
are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
The other three securities acts, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 and the Investment Company Act of 1940, though requiring
disclosure of adverse interests, do not contain antifraud provisions per se; and due to their
restricted application, they will not be treated in this note.
"0 The act defines an investment adviser as "any person who, for compensation, engages
in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as
to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates
analyses or reports concerning securities .... " Certain exceptions are made to this defini-
tion, including broker-dealers who are covered by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 147, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11) (1958).
4 Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 786 (1944).
1 See note 7 supra.
se See note 11 supra.
'TEllis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC,
177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Arleen Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1944); Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943);
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp.
315 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937).
1i IS F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.
1937).
"gThe securities acts of 1933-34 cover nondisclosure by brokers and dealers. It was not
until the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 that coverage was extended to persons dealing
solely in investment advice.
"The effect of advisers' recommendations is clearly shown by this case. Trading in
represented any fact bearing on the intrinsic worth of the recom-
mended stock. The court held that despite defendants' good faith
belief in the propriety of the investment," failure to disclose their
interest in the recommended stock violated the statutes. The court
commented that the preliminary injunction restraining the defend-
ants from further violations would have been granted even if none
of the defendants' clients had suffered financially." In Arleen Hughes
v. SEC," the court held that the broker's position as a fiduciary re-
quired the disclosure of every element of adverse interest and that
violations of the antifraud provisions could occur even if all of the
broker's clients had profited by the advice. The reluctance on the
part of the courts to construe the securities acts as requiring proof
of intent to injure and actual loss is illustrated by the case of Norris
& Hirshberg v. SEC, in which the court stated:
To say, as petitioner does, that every element of common law fraud
must be proven ... is to say that Congress had no purpose in enacting
regulatory statutes in this field and that its legislation in the field is
meaningless. On the contrary, it has long been recognized .. . that
the investing . . . public needs special protection in this specialized
field. 4 (Emphasis added.)
Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, "one of the great cases under the
SEC statutes,"'0 likewise stated that the court "need not stop to
decide ...how far common-law fraud was shown. For the business
of selling investment securities has been considered one peculiarly in
need of regulation for the protection of the investor."'" This case
revoked the registration of a broker-dealer firm for violating the
antifraud provisions of the act of 1933 and the act of 1934 by
soliciting customers and selling them securities at prices far above
market value."
The fiduciary duty owed to the public by individuals covered by
the anitfraud provisions of the 1933-34 acts was recognized in
Charles Hughes and succeeding cases and is sometimes termed the
the stock recommended rose from 400 shares daily to 2,400 shares daily with an accom-
panying per share price increase from $3 to $4Y8. SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315, 316
(S.D.N.Y. 1936).
" Even before the securities acts it had been held that an adviser's belief in the soundness
of his advice was immaterial. Ridgely v. Keene, 134 App. Div. 647, 119 N.Y. Supp. 451
(1909). "The law takes into account human frailty and absolutely forbids the assumption
of conflicting obligations and duties .... '" Id. at 453.
"'SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
23 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
24 177 F.2d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
2 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).
203 Loss, Securities Regulation 1484 (2d ed. 1961).
21 139 F.2d at 437.
" The prices which customers paid for the securities purchased ranged from 16.1%
to 40.99% above market value. Id. at 436.
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"shingle theory." 9 The major premise of the "shingle theory" is that
the securities dealer impliedly represents, by the act of hanging out
his shingle, that he will deal fairly with the public. As applied in the
Charles Hughes case, a broker-dealer charging a price that does not
bear some reasonable relation to the current market, unless that fact
is disclosed, has breached this implied representation, thus perpet-
rating a fraud on the customer.
III. SEC v. CAPITAL GAINS RESEARCH BUREAU, INC."5
The Supreme Court, in the first case to construe the antifraud pro-
visions of the Investment Advisers Act, or apparently any of the
other securities acts, has remedially construed the antifraud provisions
to complement corresponding provisions in the earlier acts as in-
terpreted by lower courts. Capital Gains Research Bureau published
two investment advisory services," one of which-A Capital Gains
Report-recommended certain securities for long term holding.2 On
six different occasions Capital Gains Research Bureau took a position
in a particular stock shortly before recommending that its subscribers
purchase or sell the same stock. On the increased trading volume '
"See generally 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1482 (2d ed. 1961).
30375 U.S. 180 (1963).
as Capital Gains published two bulletins which it distributed to subscribers. One, en-
titled Facts on Funds, explored changes in the portfolio of mutual funds; the other, A
Capital Gains Report, was a regular service which periodically evaluated securities. There
were about 20,000 subscribers to the Facts on Funds bulletin, and about 5,000 subscribers to
A Capital Gains Report, with some 100,000 copies of the latter publication being frequently
distributed to nonsubscribers. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606,
612 (2d Cir. 1962).
3'A Capital Gains Report is described as: "an investment service devoted exclusively
to (1) the protection of investment capital, (2) the realization of a steady and attractive
income therefrom, (3) the accumulation of capital gains thru the timely purchase of
corporate equities that are proved to be undervalued." Ibid.
" Capital Gains purchased stock in five corporations and purchased call options in a
sixth shortly before recommending that its subscribers take a long position, and purchased
eleven three-month puts and sold short 500 shares in the seventh corporation just prior
to suggesting that this corporation was overvalued. The positions were taken by Capital
Gains from three to fourteen days in advance of its recommendations; they were liquidated
seven to fourteen days following the recommendations. A profit of $19,674.00 was realized.
34 VOLUME OF SHAREs TRADED
2d Day 1st Day Day Ist Day 2d Day 3d Day
Before Before of After After After
Report Report Report Report Report Report
Continental Ins. Co. 6,400 3,200 3,100 9,000 12,200 6,000
United Fruit Co. 4,600 6,400 6,100 15,200 12,700 14,700
Creole Petroleum Corp 5,000 6,700 3,300 10,300 4,500 5,700
Hart, Schaffner & Marx i00 500 1,800 2,800 1,600 1,200
Union Pac. R.R. 7,500 5,800 5,200 15,100 17,600 19,900
Chock Full O'Nuts Corp. 1,900 1,500 1,100 2,500 1,000 900
Brief for Appellant, pp. 15-20, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d
606 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Note, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 232, 234 (1963). As indicated by the
chart, in each instance the report had a substantial impact on the volume of shares traded
for each individual stock.
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and predictable price movement occasioned by the report, Capital
Gains Research Bureau would liquidate its position, taking a profit.
Such practice is commonly known as "scalping."' The Securities and
Exchange Commission sought a preliminary injunction' under sec-
tion 206 (1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Acte7 to require
Capital Gains Research Bureau to disclose any potential conflict of
interest in its recommendation of a particular security. The antifraud
provisions enable a court to enjoin any practice which operates "as
a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.""8 The trial
court,' affirmed by the court of appeals," denied the injunction be-
cause no actual injury or intent to cause such injury to a client was
alleged or proved. On certiorari the United States Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case
to the district court. The Court rejected a technical construction of
the act' and applied a broad remedial interpretation which encom-
passed nondisclosure of material facts. The Court traced the common
law development of fraud and deceit, recognized the modifications
thereof as applied to securities regulation and interpreted the study
and report: which culminated in the Investment Advisers Act to
proscribe just such activity as that carried on by Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau. Justification for this position was aided by language
" Judge Clark termed "scalping" as the practice known on Wall Street "by which an
investment adviser makes a short-term profit on the direct or secondary market reaction
to its advice." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606, 613 (1962).
"SUnder authority of § 209(e) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 853,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1958) which authorizes the injunctive remedy. The injunction
would have required Capital Gains in any future report to disclose the material facts
concerning any purchase of recommended securities " 'within a very short period prior to
the distribution of a recommendation . . . ,' and 'the intent to sell and the sale of said
securities . . . within a very short period after distribution of said recommendation.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 183 (1963).
" The section of the act is quoted in note 12 supra. It should be noted that the SEC
did not rely on subsections (3) and (4) which were added in 1960 to strengthen the
fraud provisions of the act.
38 54 Star. 852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (Supp. V, 1964).
39191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
40 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962).
4 The courts below had looked to language of the 86th Congress (which was con-
sidering legislation that led to the 1960 amendment to the Investment Advisers Act) for
determining the meaning of the antifraud provisions. 306 F.2d at 610. It was there expressed
that doubt existed "as to the scope of the fraudulent and deceptive activities that are
prohibited and as to how far it is limited in this area by common law concepts of fraud
and deceit." Hearings on S. 1176 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 516 (1959).
The Supreme Court, unlike the courts below, looked to the legislative history of the
1940 act rather than to that of the 1960 amendment to determine Congressional intent.
The Court embraced Judge Clark's dissent in the court of appeals in which he stated that
"the opinions attributed to a Congress twenty years after the event cannot be considered
evidence of the intent of the Congress of 1940." 306 F.2d at 615.
42SEC, Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies Pursuant to Section 30
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, H.R. Doe. No. 447, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1940).
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of the Seventy-sixth Congress which recognized the fiduciary rela-
tionship of an investment adviser." Moreover, the Supreme Court
in the instant case held that "it would defeat the manifest purpose of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 for us to hold ... that Congress,
in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which operates 'as a
fraud or deceit,' intended to require proof of intent to injure and
actual injury to clients." In so stating, the Court once again rejected
the application of technical principles of common law deceit to the
securities field. This view would seem to find ample support in the
hearings" conducted in conjunction with the enactment of the In-
vestment Advisers Act and is certainly in keeping with the judicial
interpretation of the antifraud provisions of the securities acts of
1933-34."
IV. CONCLUSION
The effect of Capital Gains is to require of investment advisers the
same full disclosure of all material facts as required under the other
five acts regulating the securities industry. ' Enforcement of the In-
vestment Advisers Act is available without proof of all four elements
of common law deceit.48 As in the line of cases granting civil remedies
under the prior securities acts, 4' it is quite probable that a civil remedy
would likewise be available under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.0 The problem of proving damages, however, would be ex-
tremely difficult.
4 "The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition 'of
the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship,' as well as a congressional
intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an
investment adviser-consciously or unconsciously-to render advice which was not dis-
interested." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963)
(citing 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 1412 (2d ed. 1961)).
44 375 U.S. at 192.
4 Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1940); Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1940).
41 See cases cited in notes 18, 23, 24 and 25 supra and accompanying text.
41 Perhaps an analogy can be drawn between the prohibition against an insider taking a
profit on the "short-swing," and the investment adviser engaging in "scalping." Both the
insider and the investment adviser are acting upon the predictable market effect of the
knowledge they possess in advance of that possessed by the investing public. For interpre-
tation of the duty owed by an insider, see generally Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961).
"SLoss states, in writing about the elements of proof required with regard to the
securities laws: "It is obvious . .. that some of the basic problems are the same [common
law problems and securities law problems]-what is false, what is fact, what is material.
Because of the legislative background it seems reasonable to assume at the very least that
the most liberal common law views on these questions should govern under the statutes."
3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1435 (2d ed. 1961).
49 See note 8 supra.
0""The only relevant provision of this statute is § 215(b), which is comparable (but
not identical) with the 'voiding' provision in § 29(b) of the Exchange Act. There has
been no litigation." 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 48, at 1746.
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The court in Capital Gains applies the premise of the "shingle
theory" as fully to the investment advisory services as to any other
phase of the securities business.51 When the adviser "hangs out his
shingle," he impliedly represents that he will deal fairly with the
public."2 To deal fairly with the public, the investment adviser should
"continuously occupy an impartial and disinterested position, as free
as humanly possible from the subtle influence of prejudice, conscious
or unconscious; he should scrupulously avoid any affiliation, or any
act, which subjects his position to challenge in this respect."" His
compensation for investment advice "should consist exclusively of
direct charges to clients for services rendered."'"
Presumably, the investment adviser will achieve full compliance
with the dictates of the act only if full disclosure is made of any
potential conflict of interest.5' Logically, the time and method of
disclosure would seem best suited to the same report in which a pur-
chase or sale of the stock is recommended to the investor. Such dis-
closure will permit the investor to make a fair evaluation of the
advice given and will also protect the adviser from possible liability
based on a breach of fiduciary responsibility."'
The court in Capital Gains makes clear that nondisclosure is to be
enjoined, but the degree of disclosure required is not elucidated.
Although vested with such power by virtue of section 206(4) of
the Investment Advisers Act (1960 amendment to the act),"7 the
51 The "shingle theory," though ordinarily based on an implied representation of pricing
reasonably related to the market, finds application in other phases of the securities industry.
Loss states that "it is likewise an incident of the representation of fair dealing that the
dealer will disclose any substantial long or short position or other bias which may affect
his recommendations." 3 Loss, op. cit supra note 48, at 1489.
5 Note 29 supra and accompanying text.
58 SEC, Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, supra note 42, at 66-67.
SId. at 66.
5 It is understood to be the administrative construction . . . that one incident
of this duty [the duty the agent always has to disclose to his principal all
facts "which he should realize have or are likely to have a bearing upon the
desirability of the transaction from the viewpoint of the principal,"] is that a
broker or investment adviser who solicits or recommends purchases or sales
must disclose the existence (though not necessarily the amount) of any long
or short position of the firm, or any partner, officer, director or member of
their immediate families, or any employee assuming responsibility for the
recommendation, if the position is substantial in relation to the total resources
and holdings of the firm or any such individual. 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note
48, at 1503-04.
5"An investor seeking the advice of a registered investment adviser must, if the
legislative purpose is to be served, be permitted to evaluate such overlapping motivations,
through appropriate disclosure, in deciding whether an adviser is serving 'two masters' or
only one, 'especially . . . if one of the masters happens to be economic self-interest.'"
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 196 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
5774 Stat. 887 (1960), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (Supp. V. 1964) provides: "The Com-
mission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph (4) by rules and regulations define, and
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of busi-
ness as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."
